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Non-technical Summary 
The market for R&D is subject to market failure which leads to an 
underprovision of R&D from a social point of view. This gives rise for governmental 
intervention in the market for R&D. For decades, the predominant question in the 
literature on R&D subsidy has been on potential crowding-out effects. There is some 
concern that subsidy recipients simply substitute public for private investment so that 
the subsidy would not generate any additional R&D efforts. The more recent 
microeconomic literature on the effects of R&D subsidies, however, goes beyond the 
question of crowding out.  
This paper also makes a contribution into this direction. A question that has 
never been investigated so far is the effect of R&D subsidies on the distribution of 
R&D effort in the economy. The distribution of R&D bears important insights for 
policy makers and academics studying market structure and/or economic growth. 
Some work in the field of endogenous growth theory has suggested that R&D 
subsidies have an important influence in the concentration of R&D in the economy 
and eventually also persistent dominance of market leaders and thus on log-run 
monopolization of markets.  
In this study, we estimate Gini indices for R&D in the German and the Finnish 
manufacturing sector. In particular, we use data from the Community Innovation 
Survey. The sample data can be extrapolated to the population figures, and we 
estimate the Gini coefficient of R&D concentration in the economy. This reflects the 
actual situation in the economy. Furthermore, we proceed by estimating a treatment 
effects model in order to derive the counterfactual situation, that is, what firms would 
have invested if they had not been subsidized. This hypothetical situation is then also 
extrapolated to the population of firms. With regard to the R&D subsidies, we find 
that full crowding-out can be rejected both in Germany and Finland. Furthermore, it 
turns out that the concentration of R&D is significantly lower in the actual situation 
when compared to the counterfactual where no R&D subsidies would be present. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
In der einschlägigen Literatur ist es unumstritten, dass im Bereich privater FuE-
Aktivitäten Marktversagen vorliegt. Dies führt dazu, dass das Marktgleichgewicht 
unter dem sozial wünschenswerten Optimum liegt. Daher verfügen industrialisierte 
Volkswirtschaften in der Regel über aktive Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik, mit 
dem Ziel die privaten FuE-Anstrengungen zu stimulieren. Dabei besteht allerdings die 
Gefahr, dass es zu Mitnahmeeffekten kommt, d.h. die Verfügbarkeit von öffentlichen 
Geldern könnte Unternehmen dazu verleiten, sich für öffentlich FuE-Mittel zu 
bewerben, und diese gegen privates Budget zu substituieren anstatt die Subventionen 
zusätzlich zu investieren. Dieses Dilemma ist daher die Fragestellung in der 
empirischen Literatur zum Thema Subventionen, die am häufigsten einer empirischen 
Analyse unterzogen wird.  
Diese Studie geht einen Schritt weiter und analysiert die Wirkung öffentlicher 
FuE-Förderung auf die Verteilung der FuE-Aktivitäten in der Volkswirtschaft. 
Theoretische Untersuchungen im Bereich der endogenen Wachstumstheorie zeigen, 
dass Subventionen einen wichtigen Einfluss auf die FuE-Konzentration und dadurch 
auch auf Marktstrukturen und die langfristige Monopolisierung von Märkten haben 
können.  
In dieser Arbeit nutzen wir Daten des „Community Innovation Surveys“, um 
Gini-Indizes der FuE-Konzentration im deutschen und finnischen verarbeitenden 
Gewerbe von der Unternehmensebene für die Gesamtwirtschaft hochzurechnen. Die 
Verwendung der beobachteten FuE stellt die tatsächliche Situation in der 
Volkswirtschaft dar. Um eine kontrafaktische Situation zu schätzen, d.h. die 
Konzentration von FuE in einer hypothetischen Welt, in der es keine öffentliche FuE-
Förderung gäbe, verwenden wir einen ökonometrischen Matching-Schätzer. Es stellt 
sich heraus, dass die Hypothese vollständiger Mitnahmeeffekte verworfen werden 
kann, d.h. wie in einer Vielzahl früherer Studien finden wir, dass FuE-Förderung zu 
erhöhten FuE-Aktivitäten in den geförderten Unternehmen beiträgt. Ferner tragen die 
Subventionen dazu bei, dass die tatsächliche FuE-Konzentration auf 
makroökonomischer Ebene signifikant geringer ist als in der kontrafaktischen 
Situation in der es keine öffentlichen Fördermaßnahmen gibt.  
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1 Introduction 
It is a commonly held view among academic scholars and policy makers that the 
market for R&D is subject to market failures which – from a societal point of view – 
lead to an underprovision of R&D (see Arrow 1962 for a seminal contribution). This 
gives rise for governmental intervention in the market for R&D. While governments 
typically fund basic research in public research institutions, they also subsidize R&D 
in the private sector through different policies. The two most prominently used tools 
in industrialized countries are R&D tax credit schemes and direct R&D grants to 
companies applying for subsidies. 
For decades, the predominant question in the R&D subsidy literature has been 
on potential crowding-out effects. There is some concern that subsidy recipients or 
beneficiaries of R&D tax credits simply substitute public for private investment so 
that the subsidy would not generate any additional R&D efforts in the economy. In a 
survey about the effects of R&D tax credits Hall and van Reenen (2000) conclude that 
the average dollar in tax credits increases private R&D spending by another dollar. In 
two influential surveys about the effectiveness of direct R&D subsidies David et al. 
(2000) and Klette et al. (2000) criticize the methodological approach of most of the 
earlier econometric studies as these did not account for self-selection of firms into 
subsidy programs. They highlight two points. First, firms that conduct R&D 
intensively are more likely to apply for funding. Second, the funding agency itself is 
interested in maximizing the outcome of its schemes typically by "picking the winner" 
strategies, that is, R&D intensive firms with past visible innovation success are 
preferred subsidy recipients. This results in the fact that the firms that would conduct 
plenty of R&D anyway also receive subsidies, and a mere comparison of R&D levels 
of subsidy recipients and non-recipients may misleadingly assign high, positive 
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effects to the policy measure. Consequently, scholars recently applied treatment 
effects models that account for such selectivity in the funding process (see e.g. 
Busom, 2000, Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003, Gonzales et al., 2006, Görg and Strobl, 
2007, Aerts and Schmidt 2008). While there are exceptions (see Wallsten, 2000, and 
Lach, 2002) the majority of more recent studies reject full crowding out effects at the 
level of the subsidized firms. Thus, a tentative conclusion from this literature is that 
public R&D grants lead to higher R&D in the economy.  
The more recent microeconomic literature on the effects of R&D subsidies has 
already gone beyond the basic question of crowding out. For instance, Branstetter and 
Sakakibara (2002) explore the effects of publicly sponsored R&D alliances on 
patenting. Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) and 
Hussinger (2008) investigate how increased R&D through subsidy translates into 
patents and new product sales using multiple equation models. Czarnitzki et al. (2007) 
analyze the heterogeneous treatments effects of R&D subsidies and R&D 
collaborations with regard to investments and patenting. So far the literature is 
basically limited to estimations of "treatment effects on the treated". An exception is 
Czarnitzki et al. (2007) who include estimations of treatment effects on the untreated. 
However, no study sheds light on macroeconomic implications obtained from 
estimations at the firm level.1 This paper makes a contribution into this direction. A 
question that – to the best of our knowledge – has never been investigated so far is the 
effect of R&D subsidies on the distribution of R&D effort in the economy. The 
distribution of R&D bears important insights for policy makers and academics 
studying market structure and/or economic growth. 
                                                 
1 Yet, Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) extrapolate their estimated treatment effects to the population of 
firms. They find that R&D in the Eastern German economy would have dropped by 47% in absence of 
public R&D support after the German re-unification. 
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It has been observed in many studies that due to the selectivity in an agency's 
funding decision larger firms including market leaders are more likely to receive 
subsidies. This may lead to persistent dominance and thus monopolization of markets. 
As it is a commonly held view that especially small firms suffer more from financing 
constraints for R&D due to imperfect capital markets (see e.g. Himmelberg and 
Petersen, 1994, Hall, 2002, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2010), policy makers have 
often been criticized of their distribution practices within the public grant systems. 
Although many industrialized countries maintain special funding schemes for small 
and medium-sized firms these days,2 there are still calls for increasing public support 
for small and/or young companies in high-tech sectors (see e.g. Veugelers, 2009, 
Schneider and Veugelers, 2010).3 Especially for financially constrained firms with no 
collaterals subsidies can help to alleviate the funding gap; even more so as the receipt 
of subsidies can also be regarded as a signal indicating high quality of the firm's 
innovation efforts (Lerner, 1999, Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2005, Takalo and 
Tanayama, 2010). This ongoing policy discussion suggests that in the absence of 
small firm programs policy intervention may have led to a higher concentration of 
R&D in the market with possibly detrimental effects for competition. 
Furthermore, the literature on endogenous economic growth emphasizes the 
importance of R&D as one key driver of welfare enhancement. Starting with 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a, b) where research is the central form of competition, 
numerous papers have elaborated on the relationship between R&D and market 
structure and their impact on endogenous growth. Examples are Aghion and Howitt 
(1992), Aghion et al. (2001, 2005), Perotto (1999), Thompson (2001), Klette and 
                                                 
2 See http://www.proinno-europe.eu/trendchart for an overview of funding schemes in EU countries. 
3 This has led to a recent directive of the European Commission requesting the implementation for 
subsidy schemes for YICs (Young Innovative Companies). 
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Kortum (2004) among many others. Laincz (2005, 2009) introduces R&D subsidies to 
models of growth and market structures, and analyzes how R&D subsidies affect 
market structure and ultimately growth. This leads to highly interesting results: 
Because of R&D subsidies, more firms remain active in the market as the price for 
investment declines. Consequently, concentration is lowered by the R&D subsidies on 
the one hand. On the other hand, however, the effect is offset by dominant firms 
taking advantage of their leadership position. Incumbent leader increase their 
technological lead over rivals and thus create higher barriers to entry and their profits 
rise. This turns the net effect of R&D subsidies on market concentration to be 
positive. It is important to note that Laincz (2005, 2009) finds that the concentration 
of R&D (not product market concentration) in the economy decreases because of the 
subsidy. However, Laincz's (2005, 2009) subsidies are set up in the way of an R&D 
tax credit. The government rewards R&D by paying some percentage of total cost of 
R&D to all R&D-performing firms. Empirically it remains an interesting question 
whether grant systems that subsidize only selected R&D projects lead to higher 
concentration as leaders are typically preferred. 
In this study, we estimate Gini indices for R&D in the German and the Finnish 
manufacturing sector. In particular, we use data from the third wave of the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS3). The sample data can be extrapolated to the 
population figures, and we estimate the Gini-coefficient of R&D concentration in the 
economy. This reflects the actual situation in the economy. Furthermore, we proceed 
by estimating a treatment effects model in order to derive the counterfactual situation, 
that is, what firms would have invested if they had not been subsidized. This 
hypothetical situation is then also extrapolated to the population level of 
manufacturing firms. With regard to the R&D subsidies, we find that full crowding-
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out can be rejected both in Germany and Finland. Furthermore, it turns out that the 
concentration of R&D is significantly lower in the actual situation when compared to 
the counterfactual where no R&D subsidies would be present. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology 
used and section 3 describes the data. The results are discussed in the fourth section, 
and section 5 concludes. 
2 Methodology 
2.1 Inequality treatment effect 
Firpo (2010) discusses three different inequality treatment effects. For the discussion 
we denote the outcome of the firm in the case it receives funding as Y1. In the case the 
firm does not receive funding we denote the outcome as Y0. The Gini index G(FY .) is 
a function of the distribution FY . of the outcome variable. If FY1 denotes the 
distribution of the outcome variable when all observations are treated4 and FY0 
denotes the distribution of the outcome variable then ∆ = G(FY1) - G(FY0) is the 
overall inequality treatment effect (ITE). Yet, in the context of public R&D subsidies 
the ITE is not informative about the effect of the funding program as the situation that 
all firms in the economy receive subsidies for their innovation activities is politically 
and fiscally not feasible.  The inequality effect on the treated (ITT) is defines as ∆ITT 
= G(FY1|S=1) - G(FY0|S=1), where FY1|S=1 is the distribution of the actual outcome of the 
treated and FY0|S=1 is the distribution of the outcome of the treated when they do not 
receive funding. The inequality effect on the treated only analyzes the effect of the 
funding on a subpopulation, where the economy wide effect of the funding programs 
cannot be estimated.  
                                                 
4 For the discussion we use treated and subsidized as synonyms. 
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 The current inequality treatment effect compares the actual distribution of the 
outcome variable FY with the situation when no funding scheme is implemented FY0;  
∆CIT = G(FY) - G(FY0). Note, that the current distribution FY of the outcome consists of 
the outcome of not treated firms (S=0) and of the outcome of treated firms (S=1). The 
outcome distribution in the situation where no funding scheme is available FY0 
consists of the outcome of the not funded firms when no funding is available. It also 
consists of the non treatment outcome Y0 of the treated firms (S=1).  
To estimate the current inequality treatment effect of public funding for 
innovation we require the non-funding R&D effort of the not funded firms Y0|S=0 
which can be observed. We also need the R&D effort of the funded firms Y1|S=1 
when they receive funding. It can also be observed. In addition we need information 
about R&D effort of the funded firms Y0|S=1 under the counterfactual situation when 
no funding is received. However, cannot be observed; hence, it has to be estimated.  
 
2.2 Estimation of the counterfactual 
The estimation of the counterfactual has to account for the fact that receiving funding 
is not a random event, which in turn leads to selection bias. The literature on the 
econometrics of evaluation offers different estimation strategies to correct for this 
selection bias (see Heckman et al., 1999, or Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, for 
surveys). For cross-sectional data, popular choices for treatment effects estimations 
are IV regressions, control function approaches (selection models) and matching 
estimators. In this paper, we employ a nearest neighbor propensity score matching.5 
                                                 
5 In the appendix, we also present the results of parametric treatment effects estimations. The choice of 
method does not influence our result on the treatment effect on the treated. We cannot apply IV 
techniques, however, as we do not have convincing instrumental variables available. 
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The advantage of the matching is that no parametric model for the R&D equation has 
to be specified.  
The counterfactual outcome of treated firms is constructed from a control group 
of non-treated firms. The matching relies on the intuitively attracting idea to balance 
the sample of program participants and comparable non-participants. Remaining 
differences in the outcome variable between both groups are then attributed to the 
treatment. Initially the counterfactual cannot simply be estimated as average outcome 
of the non-participants, because E(Y0|S=1) ≠  E(Y0|S=0) due to the possible selection 
bias. The subsidized firms and non-subsidized firms are expected to differ, except in 
cases of randomly assigned measures in experimental settings. Rubin (1977) 
introduced the conditional independence assumption (CIA) to overcome the selection 
problem, that is, participation and potential outcome are independent for firms with 
the same set of exogenous characteristics X. Phrased differently, the selection only 
occurs on observables:  
 Y0 ⊥  S | X (1) 
If this assumption is valid, it follows that 
 E( Y0 | S=1, X )  = E( Y0 | S=0, X ) (2) 
The outcome of the non-participants can be used to estimate the counterfactual 
outcome of the participants in case of non-participation provided that there are no 
systematic differences between both groups. The average treatment effect can be 
written as  
 E( ∆TT )=E( Y
1 | S=1, X=x ) - E( Y0 | S=0, X=x ) (3) 
Conditioning on X takes account of the selection bias due to observable 
differences between participants and non-participants. In nearest neighbor matching 
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for each one of the subsidized firms one picks the most similar firm from the potential 
control group of non-subsidized firms. In addition to the CIA, another important 
precondition for consistency of the matching estimator is common support. It is 
necessary that the control group contains at least one sufficiently similar observation 
for each treated firm. In practice, the sample to be evaluated is restricted to common 
support. However, if the overlap between the samples is too small the matching 
estimator is not applicable. 
As one often wants to consider more than one matching argument, one has to 
deal with the "curse of dimensionality". If we employ a lot of variables in the 
matching function, it will become difficult to find appropriate controls. Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) suggested to use a propensity score as a single index and thus to 
reduce the number of variables included in the matching function to just one. 
Therefore a probit model is estimated on the dummy indicating the receipt of 
subsidies S. The estimated propensity scores are subsequently used as matching 
argument. Lechner (1998) introduced a modification of the propensity score matching 
("hybrid matching") as it is often desirable to include additional variables in the 
matching function. In this case, instead of a single X (the propensity score), other 
important characteristics may be employed in the matching function. The following 
matching protocol summarizes the empirical implementation of the matching 
procedure used in this paper. 
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Table 1: The matching protocol 
Step 1 Specify and estimate a probit model to obtain the propensity scores ( )Pˆ X .  
Step 2 Restrict the sample to common support: delete all observations on treated 
firms with probabilities larger than the maximum and smaller than the 
minimum in the potential control group. (This step is also performed for 
other covariates that are possibly used in addition to the propensity score 
as matching arguments.) 
Step 3 Choose one observation from the subsample of treated firms and delete it 
from that pool. 
Step 4 Calculate the distance between this firm and all non-subsidized firms in 
order to find the most similar control observation. As we match on the 
propensity score, we use a Euclidian distance. In case multiple matching 
arguments are used a standard choice is the computation of a Mahalanobis 
distance. 
Step 5 Select the observation with the minimum distance from the remaining 
sample. (Do not remove the selected controls from the pool of potential 
controls, so that it can be used again.)  
Step 6 Repeat steps 3 to 5 for all observations on subsidized firms. 
Step 7 Using the matched comparison group, the average effect on the treated can 
thus be calculated as the mean difference of the matched samples (Note 
that the same observation may appear more than once in that group. As we 
perform sampling with replacement to estimate the counterfactual 
situation, an ordinary t-statistic on mean differences is biased, because it 
does not take the appearance of repeated observations into account. 
Therefore, we have to correct the standard errors in order to draw 
conclusions on statistical inference. We follow Lechner (2001) and 
calculate his estimator for an asymptotic approximation of the standard 
errors.). 
Step 8 Now having available the distribution of the current R&D effort FY and the 
estimated distribution of the R&D effort in the case of no funding schemes 
FY0 the current inequality treatment effect ∆CIT can be estimated.  
 
2.3 Estimation of Concentration Index 
In order to test the impact of R&D subsidies not only on R&D spending among 
treated firms, but also on the concentration of R&D in the economy, we are interested 
in deriving measures of inequality, in particular the Gini coefficient (or the Lorenz 
curve respectively). We would like to compute an actual Lorenz curve based on the FY 
- the situation where R&D subsidies are in place, and a counterfactual Lorenz curve 
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based on the distribution of R&D effort FY0 where we simulate the absence of 
subsidies using our treatment effects results. 
The literature on statistical inference for measures of inequality is still 
developing and so far there seems to be no commonly used approach. For instance, 
Mills and Zandvakili (1997) discuss the advantage of bootstrapping methods versus 
analytically derived asymptotic variance estimates. Deriving asymptotic variances of 
inequality measures can turn out to be quite cumbersome or computationally 
intensive. For example, jackknife procedures for deriving a standard error of a Gini 
coefficient were proposed by, among others, Sandström et al. (1985, 1988). 
Karagiannis and Kovacevic (2000) and Ogwang (2000) discuss ways of reducing the 
computational burden associated with the jackknife approximation to a level where 
this method can be applied even with very large samples. Ogwang (2000) also 
introduces a regression-based interpretation of the Gini coefficient which Giles (2004) 
used to derive standard errors without using jackknife procedures. He argues that the 
standard error of the OLS regression can directly be used for the computation of the 
standard error of the Gini index itself (see also Ogwang, 2004). Giles (2004) also 
discusses the usefulness of the regression-based approach with respect to hypothesis 
testing. Modarres and Gastwirth (2006), however, conduct simulations and find that 
the standard errors of the Giles (2004) and Ogwang (2002, 2004) procedures are quite 
inaccurate. They recommend returning to the complex or computationally intensive 
methods. Giles (2006) and Ogwang (2006) do not disagree with the Modarres-
Gastwirth criticism. 
Consequently, we prefer an application of the percentile bootstrap method as 
suggested by Mills and Zandvakili (1997). Bootstrapping the probability intervals of 
the Gini coefficient has several advantages compared to using analytical standard 
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errors. As the Gini coefficient is a non-linear function of a random variable, the 
interval estimates available from asymptotic theory may not be accurate and the small 
sample properties are not known. Furthermore, analytical standard errors cannot 
account for the fact that the Gini coefficient lies in the [0,1] interval, and thus may 
lead to estimations beyond the theoretical bounds. The bootstrap, in contrast, provides 
intervals drawn from a small sample distribution and takes into account the bounds of 
the Gini index. Mills and Zandvakili (1997) have shown that the percentile bootstrap 
method performs well in a variety of applications.  
In addition, the percentile bootstrap method also allows us to incorporate 
sampling weights easily, and also accounts for the fact that our counterfactual Lorenz 
curve will be partly based on estimated data which leads to larger sample variation.  
Most recently, Davidson (2009) suggested an approximation procedure for 
obtaining reliable standard errors of the Gini index, and also suggests using a 
bootstrap percentile t-method which provides an asymptotic refinement. 
Unfortunately, this requires the calculation of the standard error as Davidson suggests, 
and he does not provide information on how to incorporate sampling weights. 
Admittedly, Bhattacharya (2007) derives asymptotic inference for stratified and 
clustered data, but as Davidson (2009: 30) points out, this “[…] is however not at all 
easy to implement”. Therefore, we stick to the percentile bootstrap method as 
proposed by Mills and Zandvakili (1997).  
For our application, we consequently compute the Lorenz curve, or Gini index 
respectively, for stratified random samples. This is straightforward as it amounts to a 
calculation of the Gini coefficient with clustered data. The actual Gini index, G(FY), is 
computed based on the data of actual R&D employment as it is in the sample. In order 
to derive the counterfactual Gini index of inequality, G(FY0), we simply replace the 
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actual R&D figure Y1 of the treated firms (S=1) , with the counterfactual situation, Y0 
= Y1 - ∆TT, which we obtain from the treatment effects estimation. As discussed 
above, we use the actual sample data for both the actual and the counterfactual R&D 
effort to compute the Gini index.  
The only remaining choice to be made is the number of bootstrap replications, 
B. We follow Davidson and MacKinnon (2000) who suggest to choose B so that 
α(B+1) is an integer. Thus, for a significance level of α = 0.05, it is recommended to 
choose at least B = 399. Then the critical values for the hypothesis test ∆CIT = G(FY) - 
G(FY0) = 0 are given by the 10th and 390th value (lower and upper α/2 quantiles) of the 
distribution of b∆CIT (with b = 1,…,B).  
3 Data  
3.1 Data source  
The data basis for this analysis is the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The 
CIS, launched in 1991 jointly by Eurostat and the Innovation and SME Program, aims 
at improving the empirical basis of innovation theory and policy at the European level 
by surveying innovation activities at the enterprise level in the Member States’ 
economies. The CIS surveys collect firm-level data on innovation activities across 
member states by means of largely harmonized questionnaires. Thus the data are 
comparable on the European scale. The surveys are based on a stratified random 
sample of companies within the respective economies. In this analysis we use the 
third wave of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS3) for Germany and Finland 
which covers the years 1998 to 2000.6  
                                                 
6 Detailed information about the design of the survey and the collection of the data can be found in 
Eurostat (2004). 
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The concepts used in the Community Innovation Survey closely reflect the 
definitions of the Oslo Manual (OECD 1997) and thus provide a good coverage to 
build indicators that can be used to analyze the effects of government intervention 
into corporate innovation. The analysis below will not only draw upon the 
Community Innovation Survey, but also construct a patent stock indicator capturing 
the corporate knowledge accumulation and patenting history of individual firms. We 
utilize data on patent applications with the Finnish and German patenting offices.  
3.2 Variables 
We analyze the effect of governmental intervention on the number of R&D 
employees in the firm (RD) and the R&D intensity (RDINT) measured by the fraction 
of R&D employees of all employees. The latter is not used for the calculation of the 
Gini index in the second step, but included for information only as this is the standard 
variable used by most of the previous studies. The innovation surveys contain 
information whether the firm has received government funding. We utilize the 
dummy variable (SUBS) on whether individual firms received public funding for their 
innovation activities from international, national or regional sources. As control 
variables we use the size of the firm measured by the log of the number of employees 
(LNEMP), the export share of turnover (EXQU) and the accumulated knowledge 
measured by the number of discounted patents per employee (PATSTOCK/EMPL). 
Additionally we capture essential characteristics of the firm by dummy variables, 
whether the firm is part of a corporate group (GROUP), whether this corporate group 
is headquartered internationally (FOREIGN) and whether the firm has been 
established in the three years prior to the observation (EST). Sectoral characteristics 
are captured by the Herfindahl index of sales concentration at the NACE 3-digit level 
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(HHI)7, the level of R&D in the industry (INDRDN) and 10 industry dummies. Being 
targeted by special funding programs firms from Eastern Germany are identified 
through the dummy variable (EAST) in the German data set.  
To arrive at estimates for the whole population of firms the sampling weights 
supplied with the survey data are used for the whole analysis. 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
The variables used in the analysis are summarized in Table 2. The overall data 
set contains 1,000 observations in the Finnish sample and 1,403 observations in the 
German sample.  
                                                 
7 Due to data availability the analysis of the Finnish sample uses the CR10 concentration ratio. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the used samples 
 Finland (N=1,000)  
 Not Funded Funded  
Variable Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.  
RD 0.540 0.084 7.829 1.874 *** 
RDINT 0.006 0.001 0.057 0.006 *** 
LNEMP 3.461 0.039 3.908 0.079 *** 
PSTOCK/EMPL 0.004 0.001 0.017 0.003 *** 
EXQU 0.329 0.009 0.397 0.017 *** 
GROUP 0.324 0.022 0.383 0.034  
FOREIGN 0.071 0.011 0.087 0.015  
EST 0.074 0.013 0.109 0.022  
HHI 0.442 0.007 0.478 0.012 ** 
INDRND 1.033 0.171 3.529 0.932 *** 
P(SUBS) 0.214 0.005 0.337 0.014 *** 
 Germany (N=1,403)  
 Not Funded Funded  
Variable Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.  
RD 2.026 0.161 7.476 0.647 *** 
RDINT 0.023 0.002 0.090 0.007 *** 
LNEMP 3.761 0.035 4.121 0.078 *** 
PSTOCK/EMPL 0.011 0.002 0.015 0.002 * 
EXQU 0.138 0.008 0.194 0.016 *** 
GROUP 0.222 0.016 0.312 0.036 ** 
FOREIGN 0.053 0.007 0.054 0.013  
EST 0.017 0.004 0.028 0.015  
HHI 39.547 2.367 42.185 4.543  
INDRND 2.076 0.119 3.085 0.253 *** 
EAST 0.115 0.009 0.309 0.031 *** 
P(SUBS) 0.157 0.004 0.277 0.012 *** 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates a significance level of a two-tailed t-test on mean 
differences of 1% (5%, 10%). Weights used. P(SUBS) is the estimated probability of 
receiving a subsidy. The Probit regression for this estimation is reported in Table 3. 
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4 Results  
Before we analyze the effects of the public subsidies on the mean R&D 
employees and the mean innovation intensity we report the results of the matching 
approach.  
4.1 Matching  
Table 2 compares the mean of the exogenous and the endogenous variables 
before matching. We observe significant differences in the R&D effort measured by 
the number of R&D personnel (RD) and by the R&D intensity (RDINT). We also 
observe that the funded companies are significantly larger (LNEMP), have higher 
patent stock per employee (PSTOCK/EMPL) and a higher export share (EXQU) than 
the not funded companies in the raw data set. Additionally, funded firms are more 
likely to be found in sectors with a higher concentration and a higher R&D intensity. 
Overall the Finnish (German) sample contains 1,000 (1,403) companies, of which 349 
(343) receive public funding.  
Table 3 reports the Probit regressions of the funding dummies. The results show 
that larger companies are more likely to receive public funding (LNEMP). For 
previous experience in successful invention (PSTOCK/EMPL) we find an inverse U-
shape. When calculating the peak of the curve, however, it turns out that it is located 
at the right end of the patent per employee distribution for both countries. Thus we 
basically find a positive effect on the likelihood to receive funding, but with 
decreasing marginal returns to experience in inventive activity. Foreign ownership 
reduces the likelihood of receiving funding. In contrast to the German sample the 
effect is not significant in the Finnish sample.  
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Table 3: Probit regression of the public funding dummy (weights used)  
 Finland Germany 
SUBS Coef. Std. Err.  Coef. Std. Err.  
LNEMP 0.268 0.054 *** 0.171 0.053 *** 
PSTOCK/EMPL 12.423 2.398 *** 12.902 4.206 *** 
(PSTOCK/EMPL)2 -16.892 4.397 *** -70.443 26.908 *** 
EXQU 0.552 0.212 *** 0.172 0.288  
EAST - -  0.819 0.110 *** 
GROUP -0.205 0.138  0.127 0.162  
FOREIGN -0.236 0.164  -0.427 0.187 ** 
EST 0.251 0.188  0.296 0.443  
HHI 0.365 0.348  0.000 0.001  
INDRND 0.005 0.005  0.036 0.030  
CONS -2.357 0.313 *** -2.448 0.304 *** 
No. of obs. 1,000   1,403   
Wald χ2 (df+) 100.07 ***  123.37 ***  
McFadden R2 0.102   0.121   
Sum of weights 3,900   49,808   
Note: *** (**, *) indicates a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Regressions include 
10 sector dummies not reported here, which are jointly significant. + Regression for 
Finland: df=19; regression for Germany: df=20. 
 
We use the propensity score to receive public funding as the matching criterion. 
For each of the subsidized companies we match one company from the subsample of 
non-subsidized companies which is most similar in terms of the propensity to receive 
funding and which operates in the same sector. To achieve common support 13 (15) 
companies have to be dropped in the Finnish (German) data set. The weights of the 
matched non-funded companies (matched controls) are chosen such as to ensure that 
the sum of the weights of the matched controls equals the sum of the weights of the 
funded firms. 
To illustrate the effect the matching procedure has on the composition of the 
sample we report the mean of the exogenous company characteristics before and after 
the matching procedure. Table 4 displays the mean of the exogenous characteristics. It 
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reveals that the matching procedure succeeded in balancing the sample of not funded 
firms. On the average the sample of the funded companies and the sample of the not 
funded companies are the same with respect to the exogenous characteristics.  
Table 4: Means of the exogenous variables after matching (weights used)  
 Finland (N=674)  
 
Counterfactual  
(not funded - matched) 
Actual  
(funded)  
 
 Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.  
LNEMP 3.994 0.081 3.890 0.079  
PSTOCK/EMPL 0.016 0.003 0.014 0.003  
EXQU 0.380 0.017 0.393 0.016  
GROUP 0.487 0.038 0.378 0.034  
FOREIGN 0.101 0.017 0.089 0.015  
EST 0.085 0.016 0.111 0.023  
HHI 0.495 0.012 0.475 0.012  
INDRND 3.399 0.956 2.958 0.880  
P(SUBS) 0.328 0.013 0.330 0.014  
 Germany (N=656)  
 
Counterfactual  
(not funded - matched) 
Actual  
(funded)  
 
 Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.  
LNEMP 4.193 0.082 4.109 0.079  
PSTOCK/EMPL 0.013 0.002 0.015 0.002  
EXQU 0.197 0.020 0.195 0.016  
EAST 0.345 0.032 0.297 0.030  
GROUP 0.318 0.032 0.309 0.037  
FOREIGN 0.083 0.019 0.055 0.013  
EST 0.039 0.015 0.025 0.015  
HHI 43.441 4.039 42.30 4.633  
INDRND 3.329 0.284 3.123 0.258  
P(SUBS) 0.282 0.011 0.271 0.012  
Note: *** (**, *) indicates a significance level of a two-tailed t-test on mean 
differences of 1% (5%, 10%). The sum of weights in the Finnish (German) sample 
 is 1,870 (16,060). 
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4.2 Treatment effects  
Table 6 reports the mean effect of the public subsidy on the innovation input of 
the treated firms measured by the R&D intensity and measured by the number of 
R&D employees.  
Table 6: Mean effect of the public subsidy on the R&D intensity and the R&D 
employees  
Finland (N=674) RDINT RD 
Counterfactual (not funded - matched)  0.015 2.266 
Actual (funded)  0.053 5.603 
∆TT 0.038*** 3.337*** 
Germany (N=656) RDINT RD 
Counterfactual (not funded - matched)  0.028  3.290  
Actual (funded)  0.090 7.361  
∆TT 0.062*** 4.071*** 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). The sum of weights 
in the Finnish (German) sample is 1,870 (16,060). 
 
For both the Finnish and the German sample we find significantly positive mean 
treatment effects for the funded firms. On the average the public subsidies induce an 
increase of the R&D input. This finding rejects complete crowding out of private 
R&D efforts by public subsidies. 
 
4.3 Effects on the distribution  
Having established the effect on the mean of the innovation input, we now turn to the 
effect public subsidies have on the distribution of innovation effort investigating the 
current inequality treatment effect ∆CIT based on the estimated distribution of the 
number of R&D employees.  
Table 8 summarizes the effects of the public subsidies on the distribution of 
innovation activity. It shows that with the subsidies the innovation activities are more 
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equally distributed over the sample of companies than they would have been the case 
without the subsidies. Subsidies reduce the Gini coefficient of R&D effort in the 
Finnish manufacturing from 0.9413 to 0.9182. In the German manufacturing subsidies 
induce a reduction in the Gini coefficient from 0.890 to 0.8450. The reduction in the 
concentration of R&D effort is visualized by the Lorenz curves in Figure 1 and Figure 
2.  
For the German sample the distribution of the bootstrapped Gini-coefficients 
indicates that subsidies induce reduction in concentration which is significant at the 1 
percent level of significance. Yet, the initial 399 bootstrapping repetitions suggest in 
the Finnish sample that the reduction in concentration is significant slightly above the 
5 percent level of significance. With 799 bootstrapping repetitions we find it to be 
significant at the 5 percent level.  
Table 8 Effects of public funding on the distribution of innovative activity  
Gini coefficient Finland 
Actual (with funding) G(FY) 0.9182 
Counterfactual (without funding) G(FY0)  0.9413 
G(FY) - G(FY0) = ∆CIT  -0.0231** 
95% CI (∆CIT) [-0.0362, 0.001] 
95% CI (∆CIT) [-0.0392;-0.001]+ 
    
   Germany 
Actual (with funding) G(FY) 0.8450 
Counterfactual (without funding) G(FY0)  0.8900 
G(FY) - G(FY0) = ∆CIT  -0.0451*** 
95% CI (∆CIT) [-0.0614;-0.0278] 
Note: *** (**, *) indicates a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). Confidence 
interval and mean based on 399 bootstrap replications; +Confidence interval based 
on 799 bootstrap replications. 
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Figure 1 Lorenz-curve for the distribution of the R&D personnel (Finland)  
 
Figure 2 Lorenz-curve for the distribution of the R&D personnel (Germany)  
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5 Conclusion  
This study has investigated the effects of R&D subsidies on corporate R&D in 
the Finnish and German manufacturing sector. In addition to calculating a treatment 
effect on the treated, we proposed to use this estimation for further macroeconomic 
implications. In particular, we were interested in the effect of subsidies on 
concentration of R&D in the business sector. As new growth theory has suggested, we 
find that public funding of R&D effort decreases the concentration of R&D in the 
economy. This, however, is by no means trivial. In contrast to the theoretical models 
that assume subsidies in form of R&D tax credits such that each R&D performer is 
reimbursed a certain percentage of its total R&D budget, we investigate two countries 
that do not employ R&D tax credits but subsidize innovation activity through a 
systems of direct grants. As the subsidies are based on proposal submissions of the 
firms and expert evaluations, such subsidy instruments are much more selective than 
R&D tax credits used in the theoretical literature.  
We find that the German and Finnish subsidy systems do not lead to higher 
R&D concentration, moreover our results suggest that R&D concentration is 
significantly reduced by the subsidies. This gives rise to interesting policy 
conclusions. First, this result may be attributed to the fact that governments maintain 
special programs for small and medium-sized firms nowadays. These programs allow 
small firms to conduct R&D with the result that more firms are active in R&D. 
Financial constraints in the credit market may foreclose such investments otherwise. 
This effect can be seen in the Lorenz curves in Figures 1 and 2. In the counterfactual 
situation describing the absence of R&D policy, many more firms would not conduct 
R&D. The actual number of R&D performing companies would be reduced by 23% 
(33%) in Germany (Finland) if there had not been subsidies. This illustrates the fact 
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that subsidies are effective in inducing R&D activities in firms which otherwise 
would not have performed R&D activities.   
This fact outweighs the observation that larger firms are more likely to receive 
subsidies with respect to the concentration. Therefore, we also conclude that subsidies 
do not contribute to the long-run monopolization of R&D in the economy.  
Of course, our study is not without limitations. We employ a nearest neighbor 
matching to estimate the treatment effect on the treated using two cross-sectional 
databases from Finland and Germany. It would certainly be interesting to apply more 
advanced methods such as conditional difference-in-difference estimation that would 
allow controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of firms. Unfortunately, we do not 
have panel data available for our study which limits the scope for using alternative 
estimation techniques. For further research it would also be interesting to apply 
quantile treatment effects in our context (see e.g. Abadie et al., 2002, Chernozhukov 
and Hansen, 2005, Firpo, 2007). However, the methods proposed by Abadie et al. 
(2002) and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) would require instrumental variables. 
Unfortunately, we do not have variables in our data that are convincing candidates for 
instruments, i.e., variables that determine the subsidy receipt but do in turn not impact 
on R&D.  
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Appendix 
In addition to the matching estimator presented in the main body of the text, we 
also experimented with the application of parametric treatment effects models based 
on the well-known sample selection model. In contrast to matching this also controls 
for selection on unobservable. A convincing application, however, requires an 
exclusion restriction, i.e. a variable that determines the subsidy receipt but not R&D. 
In our case, we do not have convincing variable in our data that could be justified as 
exclusion restriction on theoretical basis. Therefore, we could only follow an 
empirical approach and searched for a variable that is significant in the subsidy 
equation but not in the R&D equation. We found that the square of the patent stock 
per employee can serve as exclusion restriction in this case. As this is not fully 
convincing because we only rely on the non-linearity of the functional form (in 
addition to the non-linearity of the mills ratio), we relegated the results to the 
appendix. However, as the results in the following table show, full crowding out can 
also be rejected when selection on unobservables is taken into account. 
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Table 9: Parametric treatment effects models  
 FINLAND GERMANY 
 RD   RDINT   RD   RDINT   
 Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E.  
LNEMP 2.100 0.266 *** -0.001 0.002  3.351 0.319 *** -0.010 0.002 *** 
PSTOCK/EMPL 3.339 4.100  0.242 0.104 ** 27.012 7.447 *** 0.081 0.057  
EXQU 4.322 0.715 *** 0.010 0.009  1.506 1.093  0.037 0.013 *** 
GROUP 0.363 0.327  0.010 0.004 ** 1.170 0.529 ** 0.003 0.006  
FOREIGN -0.844 0.815  -0.004 0.007  -1.982 1.133 * -0.012 0.007 * 
GRUEND -0.545 0.416  -0.002 0.005  1.511 0.719 ** 0.013 0.016  
HHI -2.792 1.631 * -0.009 0.016  -0.002 0.003  0.000 0.000  
INDRND -0.003 0.021  0.001 0.001 ** -0.006 0.191  0.001 0.002  
EAST       -0.745 0.328 ** 0.004 0.005  
SUBS 3.731 0.494 *** 0.050 0.006 *** 4.694 0.738 *** 0.065 0.008 *** 
CONS -7.221 1.196 *** 0.000 0.009  -12.705 1.296 *** 0.042 0.009 *** 
SUBS EQUATION SUBS EQUATION 
LNEMP 0.267 0.055 *** 0.261 0.054 *** 0.178 0.054 *** 0.168 0.054 *** 
PSTOCK/EMPL 12.115 2.509 *** 12.768 2.612 *** 13.271 4.244 *** 12.967 4.237 *** 
PSTOCK/EMPL2 -17.722 5.084 *** -19.355 5.415 *** -72.435 27.412 *** -69.875 26.966 ** 
EXQU 0.549 0.211 *** 0.553 0.209 *** 0.173 0.286  0.176 0.287  
GROUP -0.217 0.137  -0.209 0.137  0.123 0.162  0.126 0.164  
FOREIGN -0.226 0.165  -0.221 0.164  -0.428 0.186 ** -0.425 0.188 ** 
GRUEND 0.267 0.192  0.274 0.190  0.301 0.447  0.297 0.444  
HHI 0.336 0.343  0.346 0.336  0.000 0.001  0.000 0.001  
INDRND 0.005 0.005  0.005 0.005  0.036 0.030  0.037 0.030  
EAST -   -   0.823 0.111 *** 0.823 0.110 *** 
CONS -2.510 0.313 *** -2.488 0.306 *** -2.480 0.307 *** -2.439 0.305 *** 
NOBS 990   1000   1403   1403   
WALD χ2 129.1 ***  169.06 ***  270.63 ***  225.09 ***  
WALD ρ=0 17.23 ***  5.99 **  6.11 **  1.13   
Note: *** (**, *) indicates a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 10 industry dummies are included in the regressions. 
In the regression of R&D personnel for the Finnish data set the 1% largest R&D performing firms are excluded. 
 
 
